On 2013-09-04 10:31, Jonas Meurer wrote:
> Hey list and fellow Nagios developers,
>
> as you might have noticed, there's a discussion ongoing on oss-security[1]
> regarding bug report #456[2].
>
> I'm the one who discovered the described issue, and I still believe that
> it's a bug with security implications, even though not everyone seems to
> be convinced.
>
> I'll try to give a brief description of the issue:
>
> The Nagios status.cgi (at all 3.4* and 4.0* versions I checked) leaks
> hostnames to unauthorized users as part of servicegroups. All of
> servicegroup overview, summary and grid list each and every hostname that
> is part of a servicegroup, regardless whether the HTTP user is listed in
> contacts/contactgroups for this host.
>
> In my opinion this is a security issue - at least on multi-user (e.g.
> multi-customer) Nagios-setups. I guess that most ISPs which give their
> customers access to the Nagios CGIs don't want to provide a full list
> of monitored hosts to their customers as a side-effect.
>
> One reason for confusion is the following entry from Nagios3 changelog[3]:
>
> 3.4.0 - 05/04/2012
> ENHANCEMENTS
> [...]
> - Users can now see hostgroups and servicegroups that contain at least
> one host or service they are authorized for, instead of having to
> be authorized for them all (Ethan Galstad)
>
>
> The indisputable part of this change is, that users are allowed to see
> hostgroups and servicegroups with at least one authorized host or
> service. Unclear is, whether this means "group and all its group
> members", or "group and only authorized group members".
>
It should mean "group and only authorized group members, except also
hosts for services where one is authorized to see the service".
> Unfortunately, no Nagios developer speaked up yet about this issue. Thus
> there's still a lot confusion about it.
>
Well, now I have, so confusion dispelled.
> You can find my patch at the Nagios Issue Tracker.
Ah, right. Care to provide a link? Mostly, I prefer to get patches to
this mailing list, since I don't spend a lot of time hunting them down
from the (underused) tracker.
> This patch changes
> status.cgi behaviour to show only group members (hosts/services) that
> the user is authorized to see.
>
> A comment about this issue by the Nagios Developers whould be highly
> appreciated. In case that the described (and critizised) behaviour of
> status.cgi is intended, the distribution security teams can move on.
>
Well, it *was* by design, but now I'm changing the design. It's a good
time for it, since 4.0 is about to come out. I think the security teams
can move on and we'll consider this "changed" rather than "fixed" for
4.0, where we do some security tightening.
> If on the other hand you agree with me, that this issue should be
> fixed, I'll continue to work with the security teams in order to
> provide patched Nagios packages for their distributions.
>
> Thanks for your work on Nagios, it's a very valuable piece of software!
>
Thanks for enjoying it.
--
Andreas Ericsson andreas.ericsson@op5.se
OP5 AB www.op5.se
Tel: +46 8-230225 Fax: +46 8-230231
Considering the successes of the wars on alcohol, poverty, drugs and
terror, I think we should give some serious thought to declaring war
on peace.
This post was automatically imported from historical nagios-devel mailing list archives
Original poster: ae@op5.se