Am 2013-09-04 11:03, schrieb Andreas Ericsson:
> On 2013-09-04 10:31, Jonas Meurer wrote:
>> Hey list and fellow Nagios developers,
>>
>> as you might have noticed, there's a discussion ongoing on
>> oss-security[1]
>> regarding bug report #456[2].
>>
>> I'm the one who discovered the described issue, and I still believe
>> that
>> it's a bug with security implications, even though not everyone seems
>> to
>> be convinced.
>>
>> I'll try to give a brief description of the issue:
>>
>> The Nagios status.cgi (at all 3.4* and 4.0* versions I checked) leaks
>> hostnames to unauthorized users as part of servicegroups. All of
>> servicegroup overview, summary and grid list each and every hostname
>> that
>> is part of a servicegroup, regardless whether the HTTP user is listed
>> in
>> contacts/contactgroups for this host.
>>
>> In my opinion this is a security issue - at least on multi-user (e.g.
>> multi-customer) Nagios-setups. I guess that most ISPs which give their
>> customers access to the Nagios CGIs don't want to provide a full list
>> of monitored hosts to their customers as a side-effect.
>>
>> One reason for confusion is the following entry from Nagios3
>> changelog[3]:
>>
>> 3.4.0 - 05/04/2012
>> ENHANCEMENTS
>> [...]
>> - Users can now see hostgroups and servicegroups that contain at least
>> one host or service they are authorized for, instead of having to
>> be authorized for them all (Ethan Galstad)
>>
>>
>> The indisputable part of this change is, that users are allowed to see
>> hostgroups and servicegroups with at least one authorized host or
>> service. Unclear is, whether this means "group and all its group
>> members", or "group and only authorized group members".
>>
>
> It should mean "group and only authorized group members, except also
> hosts for services where one is authorized to see the service".
Ok, so if this was intended, then there indeed is a bug.
>> You can find my patch at the Nagios Issue Tracker.
>
> Ah, right. Care to provide a link? Mostly, I prefer to get patches to
> this mailing list, since I don't spend a lot of time hunting them down
> from the (underused) tracker.
Sure, my original mail already had it as footnote. Here you find patches
for Nagios 3.4.4 and 4 (master from 26.06.2013):
http://tracker.nagios.org/view.php?id=456
>> A comment about this issue by the Nagios Developers whould be highly
>> appreciated. In case that the described (and critizised) behaviour of
>> status.cgi is intended, the distribution security teams can move on.
>>
>
> Well, it *was* by design, but now I'm changing the design. It's a good
> time for it, since 4.0 is about to come out. I think the security teams
> can move on and we'll consider this "changed" rather than "fixed" for
> 4.0, where we do some security tightening.
At least when I checked last (26.06.2013), Nagios 4 was still affected
by the bug. Did you change the way status.cgi checks for authentication
in the meantime?
Kind regards,
jonas
This post was automatically imported from historical nagios-devel mailing list archives
Original poster: jonas@freesources.org