XI Virtual Appliance - Remediating Dozens of Vulerabilities
Posted: Mon Jan 31, 2022 12:27 am
Hi,
We have the latest version of XI (5.8.7) with Enterprise license installed at our customer site. It was installed as a virtual appliance a couple of years ago. We went the VA route as we were hoping to cite it being a closed system when security/risk teams scan the host and (inevitably) flag dozens of apparent vulnerabilities. We have also advised the security/risk teams that we risk forfeiting support by upgrading individual components of the VA (ie. PHP, Apache, OpenSSL, etc).
The scanning tool being used only looks at the version of each installed component and then reports the dozens of vulnerabilities (eg. PHP and Apache) in it's database that match that version. The scanner does nothing to validate the vulnerability is exploitable. We've attempted to explain the backporting concept, but the argument is falling on deaf ears. We've actually been asked to have Nagios supply an official document detailing how each listed CVE has been remediated (or is irrelevant) in order to get risk signoff. (If this is possible, great! But I'm assuming it's not).
My question is, how do we balance maintaining official supportability (from Nagios) with the needs of our customer to satisfy the risk team? I know you've posted a KB article on how to update PHP to 7.x, but the question is a bit bigger than that. The scans have flagged OpenSSL, Apache and PHP as being vulnerable so far. What do we risk in upgrading all of these components? Is it likely to cause issues down the track with future XI upgrades?
I apologies that the question is a little open, but I'm assuming I won't the only Nagios customer with similar concerns. If this is something that should be an official support request then please feel free to let me know.
Many thanks in advance for any advice or assistance.
We have the latest version of XI (5.8.7) with Enterprise license installed at our customer site. It was installed as a virtual appliance a couple of years ago. We went the VA route as we were hoping to cite it being a closed system when security/risk teams scan the host and (inevitably) flag dozens of apparent vulnerabilities. We have also advised the security/risk teams that we risk forfeiting support by upgrading individual components of the VA (ie. PHP, Apache, OpenSSL, etc).
The scanning tool being used only looks at the version of each installed component and then reports the dozens of vulnerabilities (eg. PHP and Apache) in it's database that match that version. The scanner does nothing to validate the vulnerability is exploitable. We've attempted to explain the backporting concept, but the argument is falling on deaf ears. We've actually been asked to have Nagios supply an official document detailing how each listed CVE has been remediated (or is irrelevant) in order to get risk signoff. (If this is possible, great! But I'm assuming it's not).
My question is, how do we balance maintaining official supportability (from Nagios) with the needs of our customer to satisfy the risk team? I know you've posted a KB article on how to update PHP to 7.x, but the question is a bit bigger than that. The scans have flagged OpenSSL, Apache and PHP as being vulnerable so far. What do we risk in upgrading all of these components? Is it likely to cause issues down the track with future XI upgrades?
I apologies that the question is a little open, but I'm assuming I won't the only Nagios customer with similar concerns. If this is something that should be an official support request then please feel free to let me know.
Many thanks in advance for any advice or assistance.